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After the Euro has been launched successfully, the ECB and the accession countries have
begun to discuss the processes which would lead to an EMU membership of these countries.
It is not surprising that at this stage, the „Helsinki Seminar“, which brought together central
bankers from accession countries and from the ECB on 12 November 1999, has led to rather
general conclusions:
„ (...) no common path should be prescribed to all 12 accession countries with regard to the
orientation of their exchange rate policies prior to accession, the inclusion of their currencies
in ERM II or the later adoption of the Euro. Against the background of different starting-
points for the economic reform process and the difficulty of ascertaining the lead-time
for further headway towards nominal and real convergence, a plurality of approaches should
be feasible without compromising equality of treatment (...)“. 
1
As the topic has many important dimensions,
2 our paper concentrates on one aspect that plays
an increasing role in the discussion on exchange rate regimes: the danger of destabilising
capital inflows.
3 In the last few years several emerging market economies have been
threatened by a new generation of currency crises which in Krugman’s (1998) words is
characterised „by financial excess and then by financial collapse“. Our main question is
therefore, whether the accession countries can follow exchange rate targets on their path to
EMU without incurring the risk of excessive capital inflows which sooner or later would lead
to a collapse of their currencies and severe economic disruption. In this context it is also
important to discuss whether capital inflow controls which have been proposed by many
economists would be a useful policy instrument.
4 Of course, any strategy for exchange rate
policy can only be successful if the overall macroeconomic policy is stability-oriented. In this
paper, it is assumed that the transition countries are following such policies so that the risk of
capital outflows because of inflationary policies can be neglected. 
5
                                                
1 ECB Press Release (www.ecb.de/press/pr91112.htm)
2 A very important topic which we do not discuss is the identification of equilibrium exchange rates. For a
comprehensive analysis see Begg et al. (1999).
3 See Council on Foreign Relation (1999).
4 See Council on Foreign Relation (1999, p. 3): “Emerging market economies with fragile financial systems
should take transparent and non-discriminatory tax measures to discourage short-term capital inflows and
encourage less crisis-prone, longer-term-ones, like foreign direct investment.” See also Begg et al. (1999, p. 7) ,
Reisen (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p. 71).
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the requirements in other fields of macroeconomic policy see Kopits (1999).2
While the paper focuses on the five „lead accession countries“ (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia), the main results are to some extent also relevant for the other
transition countries and for exchange rate policies of emerging market economies in general.
In section 2 we present a simple roadmap for the path from the present situation to the final
aim of monetary union. In section 3 we discuss the main options for exchange rate policy in
stage I which leaves the accession countries a very broad spectrum for country-specific
solutions. Section 4 analyses the mechanics of exchange rate targeting under the specific
conditions of a disinflation phase. The problems of a fixed nominal exchange rate target are
the topic of section 5. We show that under this arrangement central banks are inclined to
follow interest rate policies that are inconsistent with an equilibrium on international financial
markets. Only for very small countries and for countries with a rather small inflation
differential vis-à-vis the anchor currency, a strategy of permanently fixed exchange rates is
advisable. For all other countries a flexible exchange rate targeting is recommended. Section 6
explains why such an arrangement is much less prone to excessive capital inflows. These
theoretical considerations are supported by the empirical evidence from Asia, Latin America
and Eastern and Central Europe. In section 7 the main lessons for the exchange rate policy of
the accession in stage I are presented. They are compared with the medium-term monetary
policy strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. While the strategies of all three
countries are flexible enough to avoid the risk of capital inflows, the framework of the Czech
National Bank lacks a sufficiently transparent monetary anchor. Section 8 analyses in which
way EU accession will change the framework for exchange rate and monetary policy in the
new member countries. In our view stage II still leaves ample leeway for country specific
approaches. This is different in stage III, the two-year period preceding final EMU entry. As
the parity that is decided at the beginning of this stage constitutes a ceiling for the final
conversion rate, the accession countries should carefully analyse at a very early stage (at best
when still in stage I) whether a precautionary devaluation vis-à-vis the Euro is required.
2. The roadmap to EMU
Although the concrete institutional frameworks are still open, the overall roadmap from
present institutional arrangements to final EMU membership seems quite clear. All accession
countries will have to go through three different stages:3
•   Stage I covers the period from now on until the accession to European Union.
•   Stage II extends from EU entry until the two-year period that has to precede the date of
final EMU membership.
•   Stage III covers the last two years before EMU entry and is identical with the testing
period for the criteria of convergence.
During stage I the accession countries have no specific exchange rate relations with the Euro
and the ECB. Thus, from an institutional point of view they are in the same situation as all
other emerging market economies. Stage II implies above all the adoption of the „acquis
communautaire“. In addition the institutional framework of ERM II is available for the
member states from Central and Eastern Europe. It includes intervention support and
intervention credits from the ECB and the obligation for the new members to keep their
exchange rate vis-à-vis the Euro within a ± 15 % band around the Euro parity. In stage III the
new members have to comply with the requirements of Article 121 (ex Article 109j) of the
Treaty, which defines the four criteria of convergence. For the exchange rate policy of an
EMU candidate the relevant criterion stipulates:
„ (...) the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing
against the currency of any other Member State (...)“.
In the following we shall concentrate on the first stage as it can be designed with rather
different institutional options. Stage II differs relatively little from stage I and stage III leaves
not very much room for country specific arrangements.
3. Options in the pre-accession stage (stage I)
For stage I we assume that the five lead accession countries can already be treated as
„normal“ market economies. This is widely confirmed by the rankings that the EBRD has
given to these countries in its Transition Report (Table 1) and by recent econometric studies
(Golinelli and Rovelli 1999).
6 Of course, there are still specific problems above in the field of
                                                
6 See also Begg et al. (1999, p. 1): “In fact, to a surprising extent general principles apply to the transition
countries. “4
financial sector restructuring, but they are of minor importance for the macroeconomic issues
that are discussed here.























44 +34 +3 3
Estonia 44 +3 43 +3
Hungary 4 4 +3 +4 + 4 3 +
Poland 3+ 4+ 3 4+ 3+ 3+
Slovenia 3+ 4+ 3- 4+ 3 3
Progress in transition measured on a scale from 1 to 4+ with 4+ signifying standards comparable to advanced
industrial economies
Source: EBRD (1999)
The pre-accession stage prescribes no specific institutional arrangements for the exchange rate
policies of prospective member countries. Thus, the accession countries are completely free in
choosing an exchange rate strategy that is tailored to the requirements of their economy. In
principle, three approaches are possible:
•   a  fixed nominal exchange rate target, either in the form of a currency board or a
unilateral peg, e.g. like Austria’s „Hartwährungspolitik“ vis-à-vis the D-mark,
•   a flexible nominal exchange rate target, either in the form of a pre-announced crawl or
crawling band, of a non-announced crawl („managed floating“) or in the form of a
unilateral fixed peg with frequent discrete adjustments,
•   a freely floating exchange rate, which implies that the central bank is not aiming at a
certain target for the exchange rate. This case can be differentiated from all forms of an
flexible exchange rate targeting by the criterion of a constant level of foreign exchange
reserves.
With this classification we do not make a categorical difference between „managed floating“
and a crawling peg. For the interaction between interest rate and exchange rate policy the5
public announcement of an exchange rate target is of secondary importance. As the
announcement has an important effect on the transparency of monetary policy, will discuss it
in the context of country-specific monetary policy strategies (section 7).
In the following, the option of a freely floating exchange rate will not be analysed in detail.
Above all, the empirical evidence of flexible exchange rates is rather devastating. In the last
25 years countless econometric studies on the determinants of flexible exchange rates have
been published. Almost all of them have come to the clear result that „fundamentals“ however
defined have no systematic impact on the exchange rate under a floating system - at least over
time horizons of up to four or five years. Isard (1995, p. 138) summarises the evidence as
follows:
“In short, neither the behavioural relationships suggested by theory, nor the information
obtained through autoregression, provided a model that could forecast significantly better than
a random walk. And furthermore, while the random walk model performed at least as well as
other models, it predicted very poorly.”
For small open economies a completely unpredictable exchange rate would make it very
difficult to achieve macroeconomic stability. In addition, foreign exchange markets in
emerging market economies are relatively thin, so that some large transactions could have an
even more destabilising effect. In sum, we agree with the conclusion by Eichengreen et al.
(1998, p.3):
„For developing and transition countries, as with the smaller industrial countries, there are
good reasons why the right exchange rate regime (except perhaps in cases of continuing high
inflation) is not something close to an unfettered float.“
In fact, with the exception of the exchange rates between the three key currencies (dollar,
Euro, yen) there are almost no countries that have deliberately refrained from foreign
exchange market intervention.
7 From the five lead accession countries Slovenia is regarded as
a „floater“, but Figure 1 shows that its central bank has systematically intervened to keep the
Tolar/DEM rate stable: after a rather short period of constant reserves (September 1992 to
April 1994) which had led to a massive depreciation vis-à-vis the D-mark, strong D-mark
purchases prevented a subsequent appreciation of the Tolar.
                                                
7 See Jadresic et al. (1999, p. 9): “Indeed, while an increasing number of these countries (together with the
emerging market economies) officially describe their exchange rate regimes as ‘managed float’ or ‘independent
floating’ (...), the fact is that most of these countries do maintain some form of de jure or de facto exchange rate
peg or otherwise narrowly limit fluctuations of the exchange rate.”6


























































































































































































Tolars/DEM (left scale) total reserves (right scale)
Managed float since October 1991
Source: IFS
Besides the definition of the target, a comprehensive strategy for exchange rate policy has to
determine the width of the band around the exchange rate target and the anchor currency
and it has to decide whether capital controls for short-term capital flows will be imposed.
4. The mechanics of exchange rate targeting in a disinflation phase
For all forms of exchange rate targeting it is important to differentiate between two main
transmission channels: the exchange rate channel and the interest rate channel. Even if a
central bank is committed to an exchange rate target, it has to be aware of the fact that
domestic interest rates have an important effect on the domestic economy −  either via the
traditional IS/LM channel or via the balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). This
co-existence of an internal and external lever of monetary policy is of special importance if a
policy of exchange rate targeting is conducted in a period of disinflation.
In fact, almost all accession countries still have inflation rates that are higher than the average
HCPI inflation rate of the Euro area which is currently 1.4 % (Figure 2). In this regard they7
are in a similar situation as most ERM I countries in 1979 when their inflation rates exceeded
the German rate considerably.












































































































































Euroland Hungary Estonia Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
Source: IFS
It is obvious that any form of exchange rate targeting has to observe two important
constraints. From the real side, a constraint is set by purchasing power parity. If a policy of
exchange rate targeting leads to a substantial real appreciation, it undermines the
competitiveness of domestic producers, increases unemployment and leads to growing current
account deficits. Kaminsky et al. (1998) show that a real appreciation is a very serious
warning signal for a currency crisis. From the financial side, an important constraint is set by
the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition. Our paper concentrates on this constraint,
because it provides an important explanation for the problem of speculative capital inflows.
Applied to a policy of exchange rate targeting, the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
can be written as
(1) ∆ s
T+α = i-i*.8
The targeted depreciation of the logarithm of the domestic currency ∆ s
T plus a risk premium
  α
on the expected depreciation
8 has to equal the difference between the home interest rate i and
the interest rate of the anchor country i*.
This condition can be formulated for different time horizons. In the context of monetary
policy it seems useful to use it for relatively short periods (one or three months). This is due to
the fact that short-term interest rates are normally the main operating target of central banks.
Thus, for that time horizon the UIP condition allows to analyse the interrelationship between
the foreign and the domestic levers of monetary policy. It also takes into account the rather
myopic behaviour of foreign exchange market participants.
9
If the domestic central bank completely refrains from an autonomous interest rate policy, the
domestic interest rate is only determined by the three other variables of the equation and there
is always an equilibrium for short-term capital flows.


























































































































































Money market rate Estonia Money market rate Germany Krooni/DEM
Currency board regime since May 1992
(8 Krooni = 1 DEM)
Source: IFS
                                                
8 The term “risk premium” as it is used here and in the literature (see Isard 1995, p. 84) is defined as a risk
premium on the expected exchange rate change. Thus it is different from the literature on financial markets
where risk premia are added to a risk free interest rate.9
This situation is typical for a currency board, where traditional instruments for targeting
domestic short-term rates are not available. Figure 3 shows that the money markets rates in
Estonia remained remarkably close to German money market rates until the outbreak of the
Asian crisis. Thus, the decisive feature of a currency board is a completely endogenous
domestic interest rate.
In all other forms of exchange rate targeting central banks can try to target the domestic
interest rate together with the exchange rate. The best indicator for an interest rate policy that
is incompatible with UIP are high short-term capital inflows or outflows. Thus, the problem
of excessive capital inflows simply shows a persistent violation of this equilibrium condition.
And all proposals to impose capital controls mean nothing else but to suspend this condition
so that countries can follow interest rate policies that are incompatible with UIP. If a
disequilibrium leads to capital inflows, the increase in reserves has to be sterilised, at least
partially. The co-existence of strong capital inflows with a constant or sometimes increasing
interest rate differential indicates that sterilised interventions can be much more efficient than
it is recognised by the literature. As Table 2 shows, the ratio of domestic assets to total assets
declined in almost all cases considerably.
Table 2: Exchange rate targeting and changes in central bank portfolios



















7.0 14,200 67.9 24.0
Korea 1992-96 8.4 20,336 69.3 48.9









Czech Republic 1991-96 7.4
(DM and $)
8,563 40.4 29.5
Italy 1987-90 7.1 (DM) 52,990 68.2 59.6







Mexico 1990-93 19.2 18,781 69.3 30.3
Source: IFS
                                                                                                                                                        
9 The “anomal behaviour” of floating exchange rates in the context of the uncovered interest parity theory is due
to time horizons that are even shorter than the one or three month periods for which econometric tests of the10
If a central bank tries to use the interest rate channel in addition to the dampening effects of
exchange rate targeting, it can determine the domestic interest rate with a open-economy
Taylor rule:
(2) i = r + π  + β (π -π
T) + γ (y-y
P)/y
P + δ∆ s 
T with β ,δ ,γ  >0.
According to this rule, the domestic interest rate is calculated as the sum of an average real
interest rate r plus the actual inflation rate π , the weighted difference between the actual
inflation rate and the target inflation rate π
T,
 and the weighted output gap. As the Taylor rule
has been developed for large economies, it has to be applied to smaller open countries in a
somewhat modified way. The domestic interest rate also depends on the degree of monetary
pressure exerted by the exchange rate channel. The term δ∆ s
T implies that domestic interest
rate has to be higher if the central bank targets a depreciation of the exchange rate.
Accordingly, the values for β  and γ   should be lower than ½ which are the values that Taylor
calculated for the United States, because in addition to the interest rate channel monetary
restriction is also exerted via the exchange rate channel. Assuming for simplicity that in the
home and the anchor country the output gap is zero, that the anchor currency has no inflation
problem, and that r is identical in both countries, the interest differential becomes
(3) i-i* = π -π * + β (π -π
T) + δ∆ s
T
Thus, for a situation where a central bank tries to disinflate simultaneously via the exchange
rate and the interest rate channel, the uncovered interest parity can be written as
(4) ∆ s
T + α  = i-i* = π -π * + β (π -π
T) + δ∆ s
T
The intuition of this equilibrium condition is quite simple: A central bank can use domestic
interest rates for disinflation only to the extent that the foreign exchange market demands a
sufficiently high risk premium for the domestic currency at the given exchange rate target.
Thus, strong capital inflows are a signal that a central bank is following a restrictive interest
policy which is incompatible with an equilibrium on international financial markets.
                                                                                                                                                        
“efficiency” of foreign exchange markets are made.11
This “disinflation-adjusted uncovered interest parity condition” can now be used to analyse
three different macroeconomic strategies.
•   The most abrupt disinflation via the exchange rate channel is achieved if the central bank
keeps the nominal exchange rate constant , i.e. ∆ s
T = 0. This approach has been followed
by Estonia and by the Czech Republic (until the May 1997 crisis).
•   An intermediate solution can be characterised by an exchange rate target that aims at a
depreciation that equals the difference between the targeted inflation rate and the foreign
inflation rate, i.e. ∆ s
T = π
T-π *. Such an “active crawl” has been followed by Poland and
Hungary.
•   A third, least restrictive variant is an exchange rate target which simply compensates for
the existing inflation differential , i.e. ∆ s
T = π -π *. Chile’s crawling band system and the
exchange rate policy of Brazil and Indonesia (until the crisis) are examples for such a
passive (or backward looking) exchange rate strategy.
10
From equation (4) the equilibrium risk premia α * for these three strategies can be calculated
as follows (Table 3):
Table 3: Equilibrium risk premia (αααα *) for different exchange rate targets
Case ∆∆∆∆ s
T αααα *
I. constant nominal rate 0 (π -π *)+β (π -π
T)
II. active crawl π
T-π * δ  (π
T-π *) + (1+β ) (π -π
T)
III. passive crawl π -π * δ (π -π *) + β  (π -π
T)
These results show that the equilibrium risk premium declines from case I over case II to case
III. Table 4 presents some concrete values for the policy variables: r =3 %, r*=3% β =0.25,
δ =0,25, π =10%, π *=2%, π
T=6%. It also shows the value for the domestic and the foreign
interest rate.
                                                
10 See Eichengreen et al. (1998, p. 32).12
Table 4: Three examples for equilibrium risk premia
Case ∆∆∆∆ s
T αααα * i* i
I. constant nominal rate 0 9 5 14
II. active crawl 4 6 5 15
III. passive crawl 8 3 5 16
Thus, for an exogenous risk premium a central bank has to find out the optimum policy mix
(Table 5). For instance, if the exogenous risk premium is 6 %, a domestic interest rate of 15 %
requires an “active crawl”, while a constant exchange rate would lead to undesired capital
inflows. In other words, for any disinflation strategy a choice has to be made about the
relative importance of the interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel. This will
depend above all on the openness of an economy (a more open economy needs less restriction
via the interest rate channel) and on the interest rate sensitivity of its foreign and domestic
sectors. The concrete path for exchange rate targeting would be the outcome of this
assessment.
Table 5: The equilibrium interest rate for αααα *=6
Case ∆∆∆∆ s
T αααα * i
I. constant nominal rate 0 6 11
II. active crawl 4 6 15
III. passive crawl 8 6 19
5. Disinflation under a constant nominal exchange rate target
5.1 Theory
Tables 4 and 5 make clear that the strategy of a constant nominal exchange rate leaves
relatively little scope for a restrictive interest rate policy. Capital inflows can be avoided only
under three conditions:
•   if the inflation differential vis-à-vis the anchor currency is rather small and if at the same
time the need to disinflate is not very high,
•   if the risk premium is very high,13
•   if a country is so small that it suffices to rely on the exchange rate channel, i.e. β   is close
to zero.
The third condition is compatible with the observation that most countries which were able to
maintain a fixed nominal exchange for longer periods of time are typically very small
countries (Jadresic et al. 1999, p. 24).
The second condition explains why a constant exchange rate target can be useful policy tool
in the early stages of a macroeconomic stabilisation strategy (Bofinger 1996). After a period
of very high and volatile inflation and a low credibility of policy-makers, the markets will not
immediately be convinced that the new regime is sustainable. Thus, the risk premium can be
very high. But as soon as the risk premium declines, an exit strategy is needed (Eichengreen
et al. 1998).
This illustrates a specific problem of all constant exchange rate targets. The risk premium for
short-time horizons (one to three months) can be very unstable over time. If a fixed peg is
introduced in a period of very high inflation, the risk premium will initially be very high, then
go down to almost zero and after some time increase again. In countries with lower inflation
differentials vis-à-vis the anchor currency, investors will normally expect that the exchange
rate will remain constant for the time being even if they do not believe in the sustainability of
an announced exchange rate target in the longer run. Over time, especially if a constant
nominal rate is associated with a real appreciation, the risk premium increases sharply.
The problem of a variable risk premium is described in Figure 4 which presents the policy
options of the central bank that follows a policy of exchange rate targeting. The y-axis shows
the restrictive pressure which is exerted by the exchange rate target: it is defined as the
difference between the actual inflation differential (π -π *) and the targeted depreciation ∆ s
T
(which is identical with a measure for the real appreciation of the currency considered). If the
depreciation simply compensates for the inflation differential, the monetary pressure is zero.
The domestic interest rate is depicted on the x-axis. The impact of combinations of i and ∆ s
T
on the domestic economy at a constant domestic inflation rate can be described by a14
“monetary pressure index” (MPI).
11 In very simple form, such an index can be constructed as
follows:
MPI = i
κ  + (π -π *–∆ s
T)
 ϕ  with κ ,ϕ >0
For given values of i* and α   the si-lines show combinations of ∆ s
T and i which are com-
patible with a financial market equilibrium. From the logic of UIP, the interest rate diffe-
rential has to increase with the targeted depreciation. Thus, the si-line is downward sloping
(Figure 4). Assuming that κ , ϕ  =1 the monetary pressure index has the same shape as the si-
lines.
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• •
For a policy with ∆ s
T=0 and an initial risk premium of zero, the domestic interest rate has to
equal the foreign rate. With the values of Table 4, the interest rate is 5 %. On the exchange
rate pressure axis, the value is 8 (i.e. the difference between π  and π *) as the exchange rate
does not accommodate the inflation differential. This policy mix is associated with a degree of
monetary restraint of MPI0. The index line is identical with the si-line. If the risk premium
                                                
11 In a somewhat different form such indices (“monetary condition index”) are used by many institutions. See15
increases over time, the si-line shifts to the right and the degree of monetary restraint
increases to MPI1. Thus, if a central bank wants to maintain an equilibrium on the foreign
exchange market while it targets a constant nominal exchange rate, it causes very unstable
domestic monetary conditions. Therefore, it is not surprising that central banks have tried to
avoid the too lax monetary policy at t0 by setting domestic interest rates higher than i0. As this
is a point to the right of the si-line at t0, it is associated with a disequilibrium of the
international financial market and causes capital inflows.
There are two channels for capital flows. If domestic firms can borrow abroad and if they
have a certain degree of exchange rate illusion, they will be tempted to borrow in the currency
of the anchor currency. Thus, a restrictive interest rate policy can become completely
ineffective. Whatever domestic interest rate a central bank targets, the monetary pressure
remains at MPI1. Instead of dampening the economy a restrictive interest rate policy simply
drives the enterprise sector into foreign currency lending. Additional counterproductive
effects are produced by a second channel: higher domestic interest rates attract foreign
investors that want to profit form the short-term stability of the domestic currency even if they
know that it is not sustainable. Their lending to domestic banks in the domestic currency has
the effect that it weakens the credit rationing by domestic banks. This destabilising effect of
higher interest rates is described by Froot et al. (1998, p. 3):
“(...) international investors are ‘trend chasers’. Indeed, trend chasing – interpreted to mean
that an increase in today’s returns leads to an increase in future flows, without holding current
and past inflows constant- seems to explain 60-85 percent of the quarterly covariance between
emerging market inflows and returns.”
5.2 Evidence
Table 3 shows that the conflict between stable domestic monetary conditions and an equili-
brium on the foreign exchange market increases with the inflation differential vis-à-vis the
anchor currency and the difference between the actual inflation rate and the inflation target. It
is therefore interesting to look at those ERM I countries which have successfully fixed their
exchange rate vis-à-vis the D-mark (Table 6). From this experience the critical inflation
differential seems to lie in the range of 3.75 percentage points. Subtracting a certain safety
                                                                                                                                                        
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999).16
margin, the critical value could be established at 3 %. According to this criterion Estonia and
Slovenia would already qualify for a fixed nominal exchange rate target vis-à-vis the Euro.
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Netherlands 21.03.83 -0.49 0.30 yes
Denmark 12.01.87 3.79 5.84 yes
Belgium 12.01.87 1.48 1.87 yes





























Greece 16.03.98 (entry) 3.60 / yes
Sweden 17.05.91 (peg) 
1) 8.10 3.27 no
Finland 14.10.96 (entry) -0.84 0.14 yes
United Kingdom 08.10.90 (entry) 7.43 6.07 no
Austria December 81 (peg) 
2) 0.12 -0.76 yes
1)  Sweden pegged its currency to the ECU from 17 May 91 – 19 November 92.
2)  The last significant change of the Schilling/DM exchange rate took place between September 79 and the end
of 81 (appreciation of the Schilling of about 4.5 %).
Source: IFS
If the inflation differential is higher, a constant nominal exchange rate target is normally
unsustainable. This is not only confirmed by those ERM I countries which had to adjust their
parities after 1987 or even left the system (United Kingdom), but also by the failed attempt of
the Czech Republic to maintain a constant currency basket at a time where it had an inflation
differential of more than 10 percentage points (1993). The only exception is Estonia, but it
was already pointed out that this country had not tried to follow an activist disinflation policy
by keeping domestic interest rates high.
The experience of the Asian countries is more difficult to interpret. On the one hand, the long
periods of a stable Dollar rate in Malaysia and Thailand fit the observation that a fixed rate17
can be sustainable if the inflation differentials are very low. In the second half of the 1980s
both countries had lower inflation rates than the United States. In this area the crises were
initiated by the very low short-term Dollar rates in 1994/95 combined with a substantial
Dollar depreciation vis-à-vis the Yen. Thus, the external and the internal channel of monetary
policy were too expansionary. As a result the Asian countries tried to dampen the domestic
economy with a restrictive interest policy in the years 1994/95. But as already mentioned, in a
situation of “currency illusion” such a policy induced domestic firms to lend more and more
in the foreign currency without dampening the domestic economy. As it was not possible to
exert a sufficiently strong pressure on the domestic sectors under fixed rates, a depreciation
should have been targeted combined with higher nominal rates.
6. Disinflation under an adjustable nominal exchange rate target
Thus, for countries which have an inflation differential of more than 3 to 4 percentage points
an adjustable exchange target seems the preferable solution. Of course, as Table 3 shows, an
adjustable exchange rate target also requires a consistent interest rate policy, if excessive
capital inflows are to be avoided. But for situations with a substantial inflation differential or
a strong asset-price inflation this approach offers many advantages compared with a fixed
rate. For the real sector of the economy the risk of a real depreciation due to inflation inertia
can be avoided. For financial markets an adjustable exchange rate target makes it much easier
to cope with the problems of capital inflows:
•   For a given risk premium Table 5 illustrates that domestic interest rates can be much
higher without jeopardising the equilibrium on foreign exchange markets.
•   If the exchange rate adjustment is made in the form of a permanent depreciation
(„crawling peg“), the problem of shifting risk premia can also be reduced, as one-way
bets are no longer possible. A more constant risk premium avoids the threat of unstable
interest rates for domestic firms.
•   In addition, a central bank can always increase a risk premium which it regards as too low.
While this is possible under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate target, a flexible target
with a wide band avoids that such a policy of “causing ripples” is limited by reaching the
limit of the band.
•   If the targeted depreciation and the interest rate are substitutes for monetary restriction,
which our construction of the MPI assumes, a central bank can react to shifting risk18
premia by adjusting the policy mix. This requires values of κ  and ϕ >1 (Figure 5). For
instance, if the si-curve shifts to the right, the degree of monetary constraint can be
reduced, by a somewhat higher interest rate and a stronger currency depreciation.
Figure 5: Monetary pressure index for ϕϕϕϕ ,κκκκ =2
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•   Another advantage of an adjustable exchange rate is related to the sterilisation of
interventions. In principle, it is always possible to avoid the appreciation of the own
currency simply by increasing the monetary base and by absorbing the liquidity impact
with domestic monetary policy instruments. But a hard budget constraint is created by the
costs of intervention. With a constant exchange rate, the costs are determined by the
difference between the domestic interest rate and the interest rate in the anchor country. If
the interest rate differential is high, a prolonged policy of sterilised intervention can
become very costly. This is different, if a central bank follows a flexible exchange rate
target. In this case, the loss from the interest rate differential is compensated by the
increase of the value of the foreign exchange reserves. Costs are only created by the risk
premium, but an adjustable peg is less prone to high risk premia than a fixed exchange
rate target.
The experience with flexible exchange rate targets shows that in most cases speculative
capital inflows have not been a major problem. In the ERM I from 1979 to 1986 Italy has
followed a policy of infrequent depreciations (7 realignments with a first adjustment only six19
months after the start of the system) within a ±  6 % band. Figure 5 shows that during this
period capital inflows remained rather limited. The situation changed significantly in the 5 ½
years of the “stable” ERM where the lira was devalued only once (3.68 %) and where the
fluctuation band was reduced to ±  2.25 %.












































































































































































"stable" period of ERM I
Source: IFS
The experience of the five lead accession countries also confirms that capital inflows are
mainly a problem of fixed exchange rates combined with inconsistent interest policies.
Table 7: Cumulative direct investment and other financial inflows (net) to the lead
accession countries (1993-96)
Country Direct investment inflows
in % of GDP
Other financial inflows (net)
in % of GDP






As Table 7 shows, the only country with excessive capital inflows was the Czech Republic. In
all other countries direct investment inflows were higher than the other financial inflows
which remained relatively small.
In the Asian region, Indonesia with its de facto crawl received much less currency inflows
than Korea, Thailand and Malaysia (Table 8). The fact, that the Asian crisis started in
Thailand fits with its extremely high exposure to capital inflows. But because of a strong
contagion effect (Ito 1999, p. 28) Indonesia was also hit by the crisis.
“Indonesia appears to be the clearest case of contagion in the region. (...) By most,
Indonesia’s imbalances were among the least severe in the region, and clearly much less
dramatic than in Thailand.” (Radelet and Sachs, 1998a, p. 37).
12
 As above all the example of France in the ERM crises of 1992/93 shows that currency crises
tend to affect countries in the same region even if their fundamentals are solid and if they
have been able to avoid excessive currency inflows.
Table 8: Cumulative direct investment and other financial inflows (net) to selected Asian
countries (1993-96)
Country Direct investment inflows
in % of GDP
Other financial inflows (net)






In Latin America, a similar picture as in the five lead transition countries emerges. Mexico,
which de facto followed a fixed peg, received by far the highest capital inflows, while the
inflows were rather limited in Argentina (currency board) and Brazil (crawling peg).
                                                
12 Above all Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p. 38 ) show that there was no evidence for a “boom-bust pattern in
Indonesia”.21
Table 9: Cumulative direct investment and other financial inflows (net) in Latin
America (selected four year periods)
Country Direct investment inflows
in % of GDP
Other financial inflows (net)
in % of GDP
Argentina (1995-1998) 8.7 8.5
Brazil (1995-1998) 8.7 5.1
Mexico (1991-1994) 6.1 19.1
Source: IFS
In sum, a flexible exchange rate targeting has the important advantage that it considerably
reduces the risk of destabilising capital inflows. In this respect it is identical with a currency
board. In both cases, interest rate policies that are incompatible with UIP can be avoided.
Thus, flexible exchange rate targeting resolves the so-called inconsistency triangle. It allows
to combine free capital movements with an autonomous interest policy and a stable exchange
rate path. While such a policy is a good recipe against a currency crisis, it does not completely
rule it out. The examples of France, Indonesia and Brazil shows that contagion effects can
play an important role. In these cases the risk premium increases to levels which would
require an overly restrictive monetary policy stance. Therefore, if countries are obliged to
support an exchange rate target without external support, in the short run a major devaluation
is the only solution. As such an exit can have disastrous consequences, an international
framework for stabilising such currencies would urgently be needed.
7. Implications for the lead accession countries in stage I
7.1. The main lessons
The experience with different exchange rate arrangements in the last two decades provides
relatively clear implications for the exchange rate policy of the accession countries during the
period until their EU membership.
•   A complete neglect of exchange rate policy, i.e. flexible exchange rates in the pure sense
that the central bank refrains from foreign exchange market interventions, should be ruled
out. In the past this arrangement has been practised only between the three key currencies
(Dollar, Euro, Yen) and it has led to excessive exchange rate fluctuations. The experience22
of all three areas (Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe) does not support
the popular view that a flexible exchange rate regime is required because “pegged
exchange rate regimes are a very dangerous strategy for emerging market economies and
make financial crises more likely.” (Mishkin 1999, p. 22). 
13
•   A fixed nominal exchange rate target can be adopted only if the disinflation process and
the process of price liberalisation is completed. For such a step the inflation differential
between the domestic currency and the Euro should not exceed 3 percentage points.
•   A flexible exchange rate target with a relatively wide band is the safest policy option.
The findings of this paper confirm Williamson’s (1996) analyses of the experience with
crawling bands in Chile, Colombia and Israel.
14 Hungary and Poland have practised this
strategy successfully. This approach avoids above all the risk of destabilising capital
inflows. Flexible exchange rate targeting can be practised in different forms. A central
bank has to decide whether it announces the target („crawling peg“) or not. In addition,
the crawl can be active (not fully compensating for the inflation differential) or purely
accommodating. A nominal anchor is provided only by a publicly announced active crawl.
•   If the exchange rate target is not announced, the nominal anchor has to be provided by a
publicly announced inflation target. Such an inflation targeting would signal to the
public that the inflation target has priority but it would also make clear that the exchange
rate will not be allowed to fluctuate  in an uncontrolled way. Thus, “a nominal (non-fixed)
exchange rate target could coexist with an inflation target” (Masson et al. 1997, p. 9).  If a
policy of inflation targeting is combined “with greater exchange rate flexibility” (Masson
1999, S. 17), the risk of missing the inflation target because of erratic exchange rate
fluctuations is high.
•   A currency board is only advisable for countries which have a very open economy. With a
ratio of 72.5
15 Estonia has by far the highest degree of openness in Eastern Europe. Under
this condition it can be sufficient to rely on the external lever of monetary policy only.
The risks of this strategy have been extensively discussed in the literature on monetary
unions. However, in contrast to a monetary union, a currency board does not protect a
                                                
13 See also Blöndal and Christiansen (1999).
14 “(...) a crawling band is capable of achieving a reasonable trade-off between the conflicting objectives  of
reducing inflation and maintaining export growth. Furthermore crawling bands appear to perform quite well in
limiting both exchange rate and reserve volatility; fixed rates perform better in the former dimension, as long as
they really remain fixed, but the crawling band outperforms (although not significantly) an average of fixed
rates and the adjustable peg.” (Williamson 1996, p. 101).
15 1/2 (Exports+Imports)/nominal GDP. The ratios for the other countries are: Czech Republic 60.3, Hungary
39.6, Poland 27.8, Slovenia 57.7.23
country against the risks of excessive interest rates due to speculative pressure. In
addition, it lacks a lender of last resort.
•   Capital controls for short-term capital flows can be avoided if the framework for exchange
rate policy is compatible with the requirements of domestic interest rate policy. In
addition the exchange rate target should be surrounded by a “wide” band. Williamson
(1996, p. 110) recommends a band width of ±  7 to 10 percent. The experience of ERM I
shows that Italy had been able to manage a substantial disinflation with a ±  6 percent
band.
7.2 The monetary policy strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Of the five lead accession countries the central banks of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland have developed comprehensive monetary policy strategies for the period until their
EU accession.
The strategies of Poland and the Czech Republic rely on inflation targets as a nominal
anchor. Poland intents to implement this approach with a „freely floating exchange rate“
(Monetary Policy Council 1999, p. 14)
16, while the Czech paper completely neglects the role
of exchange rate policy in its monetary strategy (Czech National Bank 1999). This is rather
astonishing because the Bank is aware of the fact that the “Czech economy is a small, very
open economy, both in terms of trade and finance, with liberalised capital flows.“ (Czech
National Bank 1999, p. 3) The main difference between the strategies of these two countries
concerns the definition of the inflation target. The Polish central bank sets the target for the
consumer price index because „it is deeply rooted in the public perception as the underlying
measure of inflation“ (Monetary Policy Council 1999, p. 119). The Czech National Bank
favours „net inflation“ which excludes all price changes of „regulated prices“.
17 The main
problems of this approach are clearly discussed by Polish Monetary Policy Council:
„Application of core inflation as the official policy target would require eliminating from CPI
the prices of goods and services that strongly influence the public perception of inflationary
developments“ (Monetary Policy Council 1999, p. 11).
                                                
16 “The floating exchange rate system will be introduced following a period of the gradual expansion of the band
of permitted exchange rate fluctuations and the gradual reduction the crawling devaluation within the framework
of the present exchange rate system.” Monetary Policy Council (1999, p. 14).24
Hungary has decided for the opposite strategy. It avoids an announcement of an inflation
target:
„The Bank, as in the past, cannot set an inflation target on its own. It can make significant
progress in reducing inflation only together with the government and the other sectors of the
economy, provided that unforeseen external developments do not impede monetary policy in
pursuing these objectives with regard to inflation and external balance.“ (National Bank of
Hungary 1999, p. 6).
As a consequence it uses „the pre-announced course of the exchange rate“ as its main nominal
anchor. For the year 2000 the Bank „sees scope for further cuts in the monthly average
devaluation rate of the Forint.“ (National Bank of Hungary, p. 12). The current monthly crawl
is 0.4%, which means an annual depreciation of 4.9 %. With an inflation rate of 10 % in 1999
and an Euro area inflation of about 1 %, this crawl can be regarded as an „active crawl“ which
clearly contributes to a further reduction of inflation.
Estonia has not presented a medium-term strategy for its EMU entry, but it seems decided to
maintain the currency board for all intermediate stages:
„The fixed exchange rate and the currency board system form a suitable platform for Estonian
monetary policy in its approximation to the Euro zone.“ (Kraft 1999).
As the Slovenian central bank has not published a medium-term monetary policy strategy it
cannot be discussed in this paper.
7.3 Assessment
The strategies of the four lead accession countries with a clearly defined monetary policy
framework are compatible with the implications that can be drawn from the currency
experience of the last two decades. Above all, the risk of destabilising capital inflows can be
ruled out. Therefore, it is consequent that in all four countries capital controls are not regarded
as a relevant policy instrument.
A major problem is the Polish preference for „freely floating exchange rates“ and the
complete disregard of exchange rate targeting in the Czech approach. After the experience
                                                                                                                                                        
17 “Regulated prices include maximumprices, limited prices (both can be set on the central as well as on the local
levels) and administratively fixed fees.” CNB (1998).25
with freely floating rates, especially with the Yen/Dollar rate in the 1990s, it sounds
somewhat naive when the Monetary Policy Council (1999, p. 14) states:
„This arrangement (freely floating exchange rates; P.B.) will help to bring the market rate
closer to the equilibrium rate.“
However, the Monetary Policy Council (1999, p. 14) emphasises at the same time:
“Both within the present exchange rate system and after the introduction of a fully floating
rate, the National Bank of Poland will maintain the right to intervene in foreign exchange
markets when it recognises a need to do so for monetary policy reasons.”
Such contradictory statements do not contribute to the transparency and credibility of
monetary policy. A similar lack of transparency is created by the Czech strategy which creates
the impression that the central bank no longer takes an active interest in the exchange rate of
the Koruna. While in both countries it would not be necessary to announce explicit targets for
the exchange rate, it is misleading to pretend a strategy of „free floating“ or of a „benign
neglect“. Poland and especially the Czech Republic are very open economies which could not
afford to live with a strongly fluctuating exchange rate. Therefore, a general commitment of
the central bank to a stable exchange rate path would help to stabilise the expectations of
investors during the process to EU accession. In this respect the Hungarian approach provides
much more transparency.
Because of its focus on „net inflation“ the Czech approach provides a less visible monetary
anchor than the strategies of Poland and Hungary. An inflation target that differs considerably
from CPI inflation is not an ideal focal point for trade unions and all other agents that have to
fix nominal values for future dates. In the words of the Czech National Bank (1999, p.7):
„The fall in the consumer price and net inflation indices have not yet been adequately
reflected in inflationary expectations or in the decision making of economic agents. This is
illustrated, among other things, by the results of wage bargaining for 1999.“
In sum, it should be clear that in all arrangements with a flexible exchange rate target,
monetary policy has to be conducted on the basis of an inflation target. Such a target should
be comprehensive. It should reflect the degree of price rigidities, a potential productivity bias
and the remaining necessities to adjust administered prices. The inflation target does not
necessarily have to be published. But if this is the case, the exchange rate target has to be26
made public in order to provide at least one nominal anchor for private expectations. The
inflation target has to be implemented through an exchange rate target vis-à-vis the Euro and a
target level for domestic short-term rates. Both levers of monetary policy have to conform to
the requirements of UIP at a given risk premium. Thus, the crawl cannot be simply calculated
by a formula “target for domestic inflation minus expected foreign inflation minus expected
productivity bias”. (Williamson 1996, p. 111). A macroeconomic strategy without an
exchange rate target („freely floating exchange rate“) runs the risk of missing the inflation
target because of short-term exchange rate variations. This risk is especially high in the very
open accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia).
8. Stage II : No major regime change compared with stage I
After EU accession, the new member states will have to adopt the so-called “acquis
communautaire“ (the set of obligations deriving from the treaties, secondary EU legislation
and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice). For monetary and exchange rate policy this
includes above all the obligations
•   to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and to co-ordinate them
with the Council (Article 99, ex Article 103),
•   to exclude all central bank credits to the government (Article 101, ex Article 104),
•   to avoid excessive deficits (Article 104, ex Article 104c)
•   to treat exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest (Article 124, ex Article
109m)
•   to submit annually medium-term convergence programs, subject to surveillance by the
Council (Article 7, Stability and Growth Pact).
•   In addition, the new members are expected to participate in the ERM II sooner or later.
For the field of exchange rate and monetary policy these obligations do not require major
changes compared to the stage I. With its ±  15 % band and the option to adjust parities at
infrequent intervals ERM II leaves a wide scope for a rather flexible exchange rate policy.
Even the present crawl rate of the Forint could easily be combined with a fixed parity that is
adjusted at an annual basis („crawling snake within the tunnel“). Estonia would not need a
formal ERM II membership.27
The main advantage of ERM II over the present situation is the access to the unlimited short-
term intervention credits of the ECB („very short-term financing“). This strengthens a central
bank’s position in the situation of a speculative attack. However, as all intervention credits
have to be paid back with foreign exchange reserves by the country with the weak currency,
the support by such credit lines is rather limited. The experience of the ERM crises in 1992/93
shows that even France as a country with sound fundamentals was unable to defend the Franc
within the ±  2.25 % band. In addition, in the ERM II the ECB can unilaterally suspend
intervention credits if they endanger the target of price stability. In ERM I such an opt-clause
was not explicitly agreed.
In sum, stage II will not imply a major regime change compared with stage I. The only major
change is that countries can no longer determine their Euro exchange rate independently.
Thus, if an accession country feels a need for a major adjustment of its Euro rate, it would be
well advised to do this before EU accession.
9. Stage III: Limiting the risks of the endgame
Stage III covers the last two years before EMU membership. It leaves the accession countries
relatively little room for country specific arrangements as ERM II membership is a mandatory
criterion of convergence. The most important decision at the beginning of stage is the
determination of the parity which according to Article 121 of the Treaty is a identical with a
ceiling
18 for its final conversion rate for EMU membership. As the wording of the Treaty does
not prohibit an appreciation, a country could start the 2-year transition period with a
somewhat undervalued currency and adjust downwards if necessary.
With the ERM II fluctuation margins relatively large deviations from that midpoint are
possible without violating this specific criterion for convergence. The experience with the last
nine months of the ERM I shows that the announcement of the final conversion rates can act
as a very firm anchor for the actual exchange rate. If the markets regard the conversion rate as
credible, it will be identical with the expected exchange rate for the entry date. Because of the
uncovered interest parity, the spot rates during the ERM II period will be very closely
                                                
18 Price quotation for the exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate is expressed in units of the domestic currency per
one unit of the foreign currency.28
determined by the interest rate differential between the accession country and the Euro
interest rate. Thus, as soon as an accession country determines the parity for ERM II, it
automatically defines the path for the spot rate by the prevailing interest rate differential.
This scenario has the attractive feature that an accession country can still use the national
interest rate instrument for a fine-tuning of the economy in the very sensitive transition
period. Above all, a restrictive monetary policy could be pursued if there are signs that the
inflation criterion might not be met. Over time, the impact of national monetary policy is
reduced because the interest rates for periods that go beyond the entry date are an average of
the national and the Euro rate with a declining weight of the national rate. In addition, as long
as the exchange rate path follows the interest rate differentials, the risk of speculative capital
inflows would be very limited. There is nothing foreign investors could gain by holding short-
term assets denominated in such a currency.
The situation gets more complicated if the markets regard the final conversion rate as not
credible. In the case of an expected conversion rate that is higher than the announced rate, the
distrust of the markets would be immediately reflected by a spot rate that diverges from the
conversion rate by more than the interest rate differential. In order to avoid such a
destabilising process the domestic central bank has to intervene on the foreign exchange
market. The exchange reserves of Italy and Spain show that both countries have bought and
sold major quantities of their own currency in the last three years of ERM I (Figure 6). As the
foreign exchange reserves are limited and the ECB is not obliged under ERM II to intervene
without limits, the risk of a non-credible conversion rate shows how important it is to start the
two-year transition period with a sustainable exchange rate.
The case of a somewhat undervalued conversion rate would be less problematic. Again the
markets could regard the announced rate as not credible, but now they would expect the actual
conversion rate to be lower than the announced conversion rate. This would become visible in
a spot rate that diverges from the conversion rate by less than the interest rate differential. It
seems not very likely that such a divergence would lead to destabilising processes.29

























































































































Given the huge analytical difficulties in determining equilibrium exchange rates, the strategy
of entering the transition period with a somewhat undervalued currency looks quite attractive.
However, if the undervaluation is reached by a depreciation at the beginning of the two-year
qualification period, it bears the risk of stimulating inflation, which could lead to a violation
of the inflation rate criterion. Therefore, already at an early stage of accession or even before
accession, the accession countries should carefully analyse whether a precautionary
depreciation of their currency might be required.
10. Summary
Assuming that the five lead accession countries are strongly committed to stability-oriented
macroeconomic policies, the choice of an adequate exchange rate policy for their path
towards EMU membership is not too difficult. The experience of the ERM I countries shows
that a fixed Euro exchange rate should only be adopted if the inflation differential is lower
than 3%. In the meantime, a flexible exchange rate targeting should be followed under the
overall framework of an inflation targeting. The target values for the inflation rate, the
exchange rate and the domestic interest rate have to be derived in a way that guarantees an30
UIP equilibrium. The experience with flexible exchange rate targeting shows that such
regimes do not give rise to excessive currency inflows. Thus, capital inflow controls are not
needed in the whole transition period to EMU. With the EU accession and even an ERM II
membership the overall framework for monetary and exchange rate policy in the new member
countries does not change very much. This is different in the two-year qualification period
preceding final EMU entry which sets clear limits for the path of the spot rate. Nevertheless it
still leaves some scope for an autonomous interest policy. As an overvalued entry rate is a
major risk for the qualification period and for EMU membership, the accession countries
should target a somewhat undervalued rate already in the pre-accession phase.31
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